

διὸ καὶ ἀπορήσειεν (ἄν)¹⁾ τις πότερον τὸ βαδίζειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τὸ καθῆσθαι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ὃν σημαίνει²⁾, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοούσων τῶν τοιούτων· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐστὶν οὔτε καθ' αὐτὸ πεφυκὸς οὔτε χωρίζεσθαι δυνατὸν τῆς οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, εἴπερ, τὸ βαδίζειν τῶν ὄντων καὶ τὸ καθήμενον καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν. ταῦτα δὲ μᾶλλον φαίνεται ὄντα, διότι ἐστι τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς ὠρισμένον (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον), ὅπερ ἐμφαίνεται ἐν τῇ κατηγορίᾳ τῆς τοιαύτης· τὸ ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ἢ τὸ καθήμενον οὐκ ἄνευ τούτου λέγεται. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διὰ ταύτην κἀκείνων ἕκαστον ἐστίν.

The above aporia follows an argument in the first ten lines of the chapter which establishes the ontological priority of substance over the other categorial beings. Substance, introduced as a *τί ἐστι καὶ τόδε τι* (1028a 11-12), is viewed in the dual role of essential predicate and of essentially qualified subject³⁾. As essential predicate, substance responds to the privileged question 'what-is' (1028a 14-18). Constituted by its essence, substance is

1) I accept Jaeger's emendation. The alternative readings *καὶ ἀπορήσειέ τις* (A^bA1^cT) and *κἂν ἀπορήσειέ τις* (EJ) are both suspect. The expression *ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις*, with the insertion sometimes of an aspirated δ' or γὰρ between *ἀπορήσειε* and *ἄν*, is a commonplace in Aristotle. See, for instance, *Cat.* 10b31; *De Int.* 22b29; *Phys.* 210a25; *Meteor.* 339b3, 342a3, 388a33; *De G.C.* 317b20; *De An.* 410b10, 411b14, 423a21; *Metaph.* 1002b12. The expression *διὸ καὶ ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις* appears in *Meteor.* 361a25.

2) A^b's reading *ὃν σημαίνει*, accepted by Ross (see note in his Commentary), is more likely than the reading *ὃν ἢ μὴ ὃν* (E. J. Al. Asc.). The aporia has to do with whatever is signified by the infinitives *βαδίζειν*, etc. The article *τό* in *τὸ βαδίζειν* suggests an item taken in a linguistic mode. One should not look, however, in Aristotle for a sharp distinction between word and thing. Things behave linguistically, and Aristotle freely passes from the linguistic to the ontological realm, and *vice versa*. See D. W. Hamlyn, "Aristotle on Predication", *Phronesis*, vol. 6, no. 2, 1961, especially pp. 110-113.

3) These two perspectives are not incompatible with each other because there is an identity between the thing and its essence; cf. *Metaph.* Z, 6, 1031a17-18: *ἕκαστόν τε γὰρ οὐκ ἄλλο δοκεῖ εἶναι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίας, καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγεται εἶναι ἢ ἐκάστον οὐσία*. I have discussed elsewhere the distinction and relationship between reistic and archological (formal) senses of substance. See my article "Two Conceptions of Substance in Aristotle", *New Scholasticism*, vol. 47 (1973), no. 1.

the ontological foundation and subject of the other categorial beings which function as *its* various attributes (1028a 18-20).

In the ensuing aporia, the question is raised regarding the ontological status of the denotata of infinitives such as *βαδίζειν*, *ὕγιαίνειν* and *καθῆσθαι*. As I see it, the aporia arises because of the form of the infinitive which, *per se*, while designating an activity or state, does not refer to a subject or bearer of the activity or state. At the same time, what is designated by the infinitive is such that it cannot have an independent nature⁴) or be separable from substance. Chung-Hwan Chen has perceptive remarks about the nature of *βαδίζον*, etc., but seems to miss the point of the aporia with respect to terms such as *βαδίζειν*, etc.⁵). He obviously takes them to be verbs prior to being used in definite propositions. He writes: "Aristotle asks whether what is expressed by a verb is existent. He answers that, for example, to walk, to be healthy or to sit only vaguely implies a substance which performs the action, but walking, sitting, etc. are judged to be more real because these is something definite underlying them (i.e. an individual substance) which is implied in the very designation "walking". The expression "walking" cannot be used without such an implication"⁶). I do not think that this really explains the contrast between *βαδίζειν* and *βαδίζον*. Aristotle's point is that unlike *τὸ βαδίζον*, *τὸ καθήμενον* and *τὸ ὑγιαῖνον*, the corresponding infinitives do not have, in their linguistic form, a reference to an underlying substance, not even an implicit one. The infinitive, *per se*, does not imply a subject at all. The aporia in question arises if we understand the infinitives to stand, not for the predicative use of verbs, but for activities (processes) and states as such. Asclepius, in his commentary on the passage, characteristically renders the aporia as follows: *διὸ καὶ ἄξιον ἀπορῆσαι περὶ τῆς ὑγείας αὐτῆς καθ' αὐτὴν καὶ τῆς βαδίσεως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων, πότερον ὄντα*

4) Jaeger's excising of *πεφνκός* (1.23) is not justified. Presumably, he was suspicious of the construction *ἐστὶ ... καθ' αὐτὸ πεφνκός*. Perhaps for this reason he refers in the apparatus to Bonitz' *Index* for the combination of *πεφνκός* with the infinitive. We find, however, elsewhere in Aristotle a construction with *πεφνκός(-ώς)* similar to that at 1028a23. Cf. *De P. A.* 664a13: *ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν κεφαλὴν ὁ ἀχὴν πεφνκός ἐστὶ τοῖς ἔχουσιν ἀχένα τῶν ζώων*. *Ibid.* 665b34-35: *μέσον γὰρ τὸ τῆς καρδίας ἐστὶ σῶμα πνκνὸν καὶ κοῖλον πεφνκός ...* For the combination of *φύσις* with *καθ' αὐτό*, see *Index Aristotelicus* 838b45-47.

5) *Sophia - The Science Aristotle Sought*, New York, 1976, pp. 211-12.

6) *Ibid.*, p. 211.

ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ ἢ οὐδὲ ὄλως...⁷⁾). We may note, however, that while the word βάδισις suggests an object of some sort⁸⁾, the word βαδίζειν is ontologically neutral. The temptation of hypostatization is stronger in the case of the substantive than in the case of the infinitive. The source of the aporia is the dilemma between, on the one hand, hypostatizing processes and states, and, on the other hand, denying altogether their existence⁹⁾. The ontology of βαδίζον, καθήμενον and ὑγιαῖνον, however, is not as problematic because their form of assertion (κατηγορία) is revelatory of subject that supports them into existence. The meaning of the word εἶπερ in line 24 is dependent on the interpretation to be given to βαδίζον, etc. I take it that βαδίζον functions here as a predicate, not as a subject. It stands for the attribute that accompanies the predicative 'is' when the verb βαδίζει is analyzed into its equivalent components¹⁰⁾. Thus I believe Ross to be wrong when he explains τὸ βαδίζον as "a substance (though referred to only as the possessor of an activity)"¹¹⁾. His translation of 11.24-25 reads: "but rather, if anything, it is that which walks or sits or is healthy that is an existent thing". Contrary to Ross's assumption, εἶπερ does not express a certainty about the reality of τὸ βαδίζον, τὸ καθήμενον and τὸ ὑγιαῖνον but hints at a conceivable doubt about their reality, since they are not subjects, things in themselves, though in comparison with βαδίζειν, etc. they appear to be more real because of the built-in reference to a subject in their linguistic form. 1028a 24-25 might be translated as follows: "but rather, if at all, it is walking and sitting and healthy that are beings". εἶπερ indicates the entertainment of the possibility of a total reduction

7) In *Metaphysicorum* Z 1, 376, 34-36.

8) This is because of its substantive form. Cf. the apparent signification of a τόδε τι by secondary substances in the *Categories*, due to their σχῆμα τῆς προσηγορίας: ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν φαίνεται μὲν ὁμοίως τῷ σχήματι τῆς προσηγορίας τόδε τι σημαίνειν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῶον. οὐ μὴρ ἀληθές γε, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποιόν τι σημαίνει... (*Cat.* 4b13-16).

9) Aristotle favours a compromise between the two extremes. Compare, for instance, the following statements regarding motion: *Phys.* 200b32-33: οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κίνησις παρὰ τὰ πράγματα. *De C.* 279a16: κίνησις δ' ἄνευ φυσικοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἔστιν. *Metaph.* 1071a1-2: τῶν οὐσιῶν ἄνευ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ πάθη καὶ αἱ κινήσεις. *Phys.* 228a16-17: ὅταν γὰρ παύσῃται βαδίζων, οὐκέτι ἔστιν ἢ βάδισις, πάλιν δὲ βαδίζοντος ἔσται.

10) Cf. *Metaph.* Δ, 7, 1017a27-30: οὐθὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ ἄνθρωπος ὑγιαῖνον ἔστιν ἢ τὸ ἄνθρωπος ὑγιαίνει, οὐδὲ τὸ ἄνθρωπος βαδίζων ἔστιν ἢ τέμνον τοῦ ἄνθρωπος βαδίζει ἢ τέμνει, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

11) *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, vol. II, Commentary, pg. 160.

of all being to substance as the sole ontological category. This is not a position that Aristotle actually takes. Nevertheless he comes close to it when he ascribes to substance at 1028a 31 the exclusive title of *ὅν ἀπλῶς*¹²).

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12) Cf. Chung-Hwan Chen, *ibid.* pp. 212–13.